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Pressures for Tax Coordination 
Roger H. Gordon 
The economies of  the United States and Canada are closely linked-trade 
between the two countries is substantial, their capital markets are highly inte- 
grated, and even movement of individual workers between the two countries 
is nonnegligible. The U.S. and Canada have now agreed to eliminate all re- 
maining tariff  barriers between the two countries during the next few years. 
To  what degree does this increasing economic integration create pressure on 
the two countries to change their tax systems? Which aspects of the systems 
will be most affected? Will their tax systems inevitably become more alike, as 
each country finds it in its economic interest to choose tax provisions resem- 
bling those in the other country? When will explicit coordination and harmo- 
nization of  tax provisions be called for?’ Addressing these questions is the 
objective of this paper. 
The effects of  mobility of goods and factors between jurisdictions on their 
fiscal systems has been explored at length in the local public finance literature, 
stimulated by  Tiebout  (1956).  These  models  assume  that  everything and 
everyone is mobile without cost-implicitly,  even community boundaries can 
adjust. The basic conclusion of this literature is that competition among com- 
munities drives the tax system toward one in which each individual’s or firm’s 
tax payment closely matches the cost of the services received from the com- 
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1.  By “coordination,” I will mean negotiation to internalize fiscal externalities. “Harmoniza- 
tion,” in contrast, will refer to equalization of tax rates and tax bases, whether this occurs through 
agreement or as a result of market forces. 
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munity (or the costs imposed on the community, from pollution or congestion 
for example), a tax system known in the literature as benejt taxation.2 With 
any other tax structure, decisions in one community clearly affect welfare in 
other communities, creating the potential for mutually beneficial coordination 
of fiscal p~licies.~ 
The existing tax systems in the U.S. and Canada differ substantially from a 
benefit-tax  ~tructure.~  To  what extent can these differences continue to sur- 
vive,  given the increasing openness of the two economies? Of course, eco- 
nomic  mobility between  the U.S. and  Canada, while  substantial,  is hardly 
costless. In this paper, I attempt to assess the pressures created by current and 
prospective  levels of mobility between the two countries. In section 2.1, the 
implications of existing levels of capital mobility are examined: What impli- 
cations does capital mobility alone have on domestic tax policies and the need 
for tax harmonization? Section 2.2  examines the further pressures created by 
free trade in the full range of outputs. Finally, in section 2.3, the pressures 
created by labor mobility,  to the extent that it exists between  the U.S. and 
Canada, are assessed. 
There are three key  conclusions of the discussion.  First,  taxes on capital 
income are unlikely to survive for long, even under existing levels of interna- 
tional capital mobility, without explicit coordination of capital income tax pol- 
icies among all major countries; an agreement between just the U.S. and Can- 
ada would accomplish little. While existing double-taxation conventions may 
have led in the past to implicit coordination of  capital income taxes, the in- 
creasing complexity of international capital markets will make any coordina- 
tion in the future much more difficult. Second, unrestricted trade between the 
two countries will force them either to “level the playing field,” by eliminating 
any tax or regulatory distortions to the relative prices of traded goods, or else 
to agree on a common set of tax distortions (e.g., agricultural price supports) 
with a common set of trade barriers to support these internal price distortions. 
Finally, to the extent that labor mobility is allowed, redistribution through the 
tax system becomes more difficult. Under existing levels of mobility, however, 
this pressure is not yet very important. 
Inevitably,  the  analysis  is  somewhat  abstract,  attempting to forecast the 
broad direction of change in the tax structures in each country. Boadway and 
Bruce (ch.  1 in this volume) examine in much more detail how these pressures 
are currently being felt and the likely short-term responses to them. 
2.  To  the degree to which a community’s  taxes deviate from benefit taxes, other communities 
have the incentive to bid to attract those individuals or firms who on net pay more than they impose 
in costs on the community. For further discussion, see Buchanan and Goetz (1972). 
3.  See Gordon (1983) for an exploration of the various possible sources of externalities. 
4.  See Boadway and Bruce (ch. 1 in this volume) for a detailed description of the existing tax 
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2.1  Tax Implications of Capital Mobility 
How does capital mobility affect the design of  tax policy? To explore this 
question, assume for simplicity that only one good is traded among countries. 
Trade therefore simply takes the form of  some of  this good being imported 
now, in return for an acceptable amount of this good being exported back as 
return payment in a later period. To shorten the discussion, I will ignore the 
implications of risk or inflation. 
Without taxes, capital would flow between countries until the rate of return 
from investing in each country is the same. Let  i?  represent the rate of  re- 
turn on asset a in country j.  Without taxes and uncertainty, the return on all 
assets would be equalized in equilibrium, so that  i,"  = ii for any asset a in 
country j and asset b in country k. Given this, investors would be indifferent 
between investing in domestic or foreign capital and between investing in dif- 
ferent types of financial securities. 
The equilibrium ownership structure of  securities, and the equilibrium al- 
location of  capital, can be affected in many ways by taxes. The existing tax 
treatment of capital income is quite complex. To begin with, a corporation's 
income is directly subject to tax in the country in which it is located, under 
the corporate tax.5 If  the owners of a corporation reside in the same country, 
then they are taxed as well on the income they receive from the investment 
under the personal income tax.6 For foreign owners of the firm, however, the 
tax treatment is more complicated. Payments may first be subject to a with- 
holding tax in the source country. If the owner is an individual, the pre-with- 
holding-tax income is then taxable in the home country, but with a credit for 
any withholding tax. If  the owner is a corporation, the pre-corporate-tax in- 
come underlying the payments is subject to tax in the home country, but with 
a credit for any corporate income and withholding taxes already paid on this 
income.' Finally, payouts to the ultimate individual owners are also taxed. 
What pressures does capital mobility create, given the existing tax system? 
To  simplify the discussion, I will initially assume that income from capital is 
subject to corporate taxation only in the source country, and that income to 
individuals from capital is taxable only in the country where the individuals 
reside. In  effect, these assumptions ignore withholding taxes and corporate 
surtaxes on repatriated income.8 The discussion will start by  examining the 
implications of  capital mobility for residence-based taxes, such as the per- 
5.  For simplicity, the discussion ignores noncorporate firms. 
6.  In Canada, there  is a dividend credit, which reduces the extent of  the double taxation 
inherent in this tax structure. 
7.  In all cases, the credit is not refundable, so is limited to the amount of taxes due in the home 
country on that income. For further detail on U.S. and Canadian provisions, see Boadway and 
Bruce (ch. 1 in this volume). 
8.  This last assumption may not be that unreasonable.  Hines and Hubbard (1990) provide 
evidence that U.S. multinationals, at least, pay little or no U.S. taxes on their repatriated earnings. 78  Roger H. Gordon 
sonal income tax, then will turn to source-based taxes, such as the corporate 
tax. Finally, the discussion will return to explore the implications of capital 
mobility for withholding taxes and corporate surtaxes and to explore the im- 
plications of Canada’s dividend-credit scheme. 
2.1.1 
In principle, under a residence-based tax each country taxes the capital in- 
come of  its  own  residents  at  accrual, regardless  of  where this  income is 
earned, but does not tax the income of nonresidents, even when they invest in 
local securities or in local real capital. Let the effective tax rate for residents 
of country j on income from asset a in country k be  Then, equilibrium for 
investors residing  in country j requires that i$l  - t;)  = i:( 1 -  t;,),  while 
equilibrium for investors  residing  in  country k  requires  that  i;(l  -  t;,)  = 
if(l - t“,). As emphasized in Slemrod (1988), these two equilibrium condi- 
tions cannot hold simultaneously unless 
Capital Taxation under the Residence Principle 
for all assets a and b. Given equation (l), investors will again be indifferent 
between investing in any of the available financial securities. Firms will then 
seek the cheapest form of financing, given the resulting pretax rates of return 
on different financial securities. 
If equation (1) does not hold for all asset pairs, however, then tax arbitrage 
possibilities  exist enabling investors to rearrange  their portfolio holdings to 
reduce tax payments. Each investor has the incentive to reduce his holdings 
of assets that are taxed relatively heavily in his country and increase his hold- 
ings of assets that are taxed relatively lightly. In the process, investors save on 
taxes. If investors can own negative amounts of some assets and can deduct 
the required  payment^,^ then this rearrangement of portfolios can in principle 
continue without limit,I0  though risk considerations presumably limit the ex- 
tent of this arbitrage. 
Of course, similar arbitrage possibilities  can arise even in a closed econ- 
omy.“  In fact, Gordon and Slemrod (1988) found that in 1983 in the U.S.,  as 
a result of such arbitrage, the attempt to tax the return to saving and invest- 
ment resulted in a slight net loss in tax revenue; interest deductions more than 
offset the taxable income generated  by both  real  and financial investments. 
Countries in practice seem to recognize arbitrage opportunities gradually, and 
9.  For  example, borrowing implies a negative holding of  bonds,  and  interest payments are 
normally deductible. 
10.  Technically, this requires that  each investor be able to “go short” in at  least one asset, 
deducting the  payments from taxable income, and that  each investor be taxed relatively more 
heavily on the asset he goes short in. 
11.  See Stiglitz (1985) for a number of examples. 79  Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
then attempt to eliminate them case by case. For example, in the U.S. individ- 
uals are not allowed to deduct interest when they borrow for the purpose of 
buying a tax-exempt bond. But this is just an example of a wide variety of 
possible forms of  tax arbitrage, and enforcement of  even this restriction is 
very difficult. Under the 1986 tax reform in the U.S.,  a broader attempt was 
made to limit arbitrage possibilities by restricting interest deductions, except 
for businesses, and restricting taxpayers’ ability to deduct losses more gener- 
ally.’* When this arbitrage takes place across borders, detecting and dealing 
with it is that much more difficult. 
If  investors in each country can “go short” in  the appropriate asset, then 
capital income taxation collects significant revenue only if these arbitrage pos- 
sibilities are closed off, which requires that equation (1) be  satisfied for all 
pairs of  assets. An agreement between the two countries on relative tax rates 
could occur implicitly as well as explicitly. Neither country would want to 
deviate from a common set of relative tax rates, since doing so would open up 
arbitrage opportunities for investors in both countries--any  set of relative tax 
rates would be  a Nash equilibrium. However, both countries may gain by 
jointly agreeing on a particular set of relative tax rates. The normal presump- 
tion has been that a “neutral” tax system, under which income from all assets 
is taxed at the same rate, is the most attractive. 
If no deductions are allowed for payments on debt or other “short” posi- 
tions, then a country would never lose revenue from taxing capital income, 
even without agreeing with the other country on the relative tax rates on dif- 
ferent assets. Equilibrium portfolio holdings in  each country would still de- 
pend on the tax policies in both countries, however, making welfare in the two 
countries interdependent. Coordination of relative tax rates would still in prin- 
ciple be justified. However, as shown formally in Gordon (1986), each coun- 
try acting in isolation would have the incentive to set its tax rates so that its 
residents invest in the security paying the largest amount pretax. This is ac- 
complished simply by  equating the tax rates on all assets, so that 5 = t$ 
regardless of the tax policy chosen in the other country. Therefore, a “neutral” 
tax system may well be the Nash equilibrium as well as the optimal policy 
chosen after full coordination. 
Given any agreement on relative tax rates on different assets, each country 
could then choose independently the absolute level of  its tax rates without 
opening up arbitrage opportunities. Each country’s policies affect the welfare 
in the other country only through any resulting changes in the market interest 
rate. If each country is small relative to the world capital market, then these 
changes will be small, implying no important externalities when choosing the 
absolute level of residence-based capital income tax rates. The U.S., however, 
is not plausibly small relative to the world capital market. It has the incentive 
12.  One apparent response has been an increase in corporate borrowing, since corporate inter- 
est deductions are still allowed. 80  Roger H. Gordon 
to reduce its borrowing from foreigners in order to reduce the market interest 
rate, thereby reducing the interest payments on its existing debt. Given that 
Canada is a net debtor in the world capital market, a reduction in the market 
interest rate would be a benefit for Canada, a benefit ignored by the U.S. in 
designing  its  own policies.13 In particular,  under optimal policies  the U.S. 
would be indifferent to borrowing still less, but Canada would gain from the 
resulting fall in the interest rate. This creates the potential for mutually bene- 
ficial agreements on tax policy. 
Use of  a residence principle for capital income taxation  leads to a major 
problem with tax enforcement, however. Within a country, firms and institu- 
tions that pay dividends and interest can be required to report the names of the 
recipients, and how much they receive, to the local tax authorities. A country 
has no direct way to require foreign firms and institutions to make such re- 
ports. But if the tax authority receives no information directly about the capi- 
tal income received by its residents from foreign sources, then it will find it 
extremely difficult to enforce the taxes due on this income. Reporting income 
from assets owned abroad in effect becomes voluntary, and normally investors 
do not knowingly  make  voluntary  tax  payments.  If  in practice savings in- 
vested abroad are tax free, then all savings become tax free, because investors 
can invest  through  a foreign  financial  intermediary  in  all assets,  including 
domestic assets. In fact, they may be able to borrow domestically, deduct the 
interest, then invest the funds abroad tax free. 
Can this enforcement problem be solved through suitable cooperation be- 
tween the two countries? The countries could, for example, agree to share 
information provided by firms and institutions regarding the names of recipi- 
ents of capital income. Any such agreement would allow each country to tax 
the capital income of its residents and so would appear to be mutually benefi- 
cial. However, given the disparity in the sizes of the U.S.  and Canada, Canada 
might have an incentive to refuse to cooperate.  Without the agreement,  the 
relatively  huge  number  of  U.S.  investors  could  flock  to Canada  hoping 
thereby to evade U.S.  taxes. The resulting  gains to the Canadian economy, 
whether or not the gains were taxed, might well more than offset the losses to 
Canada from not being able to tax the capital income of Canadian residents. 
If so, the U.S.  would need to compensate Canada in order to secure any such 
agreement. 
Such an agreement would be futile, in any case, given that a third country 
(e.g., Switzerland) could agree to facilitate the tax evasion of U.S. or  Cana- 
dian investors. Such a country could open its own financial intermediaries to 
foreign depositors and refuse to share information with other countries. The 
income to foreign  investors working  through  these financial intermediaries 
13.  Changes in the market interest rate have further effects on efficiency to the degree to which 
choices were not efficient initially due to distorting taxes. In particular, if income from savings is 
taxed, then any resulting decrease in savings reduces welfare. A change in the market interest rate 
also has distributional consequences which may be of concern to the government. 81  Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
would  again be  exempt in  practice from residence-based taxes. This third 
country could tax away some of the gain that investors receive from evading 
their domestic taxes and still attract funds.I4 By  refusing to cooperate with 
other countries, it might not be able to tax the capital income of its own resi- 
dents, but if the country were small enough that would be a minor considera- 
tion.” 
Taxation at Repatriation 
Even if a country cannot independently detect capital income earned abroad 
by  its residents, it may be able to detect income as it is repatriated, through 
monitoring all deposits in domestic financial intermediaries or through audit- 
ing individuals whose expenditures clearly exceed their cash flow. What hap- 
pens if  a country simply taxes capital income at repatriation? If  repatriated 
income is taxed at the same rate, regardless of  the date of repatriation, then 
the effective tax rate on capital income is reduced the longer repatriation is 
postponed; if repatriation can be postponed indefinitely, then the effective tax 
rate goes to zero. Economic repatriation may even be possible without trigger- 
ing the repatriation tax. For example, the investor may be able to borrow at 
home, possibly using the foreign assets as collateral. The borrowed funds 
could be used to finance any desired expenditures at home and in fact could 
lead to further tax savings through interest deductions. The U.S. tax law has 
evolved over time, trying to close off  such devices for avoiding the repatria- 
tion tax, but doing so is very difficult. 
2.1.2  Capital Taxation under the Source Principle 
Under a source-based tax, each country would tax the return to real capital 
located within its borders, with rates perhaps varying by type of real capital.I6 
If  in country j  the returns to asset a are taxed at rate t;, then in equilibrium 
i;( 1 -  t;) = ii(  1 -  ti)  for all assets a and b. Since this condition is the same 
for investors in each country, allowing for capital mobility does not create 
additional complications when characterizing the equilibrium. 
What can be said about the optimal source-based capital income tax rate? 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) argued that when all excise taxes can be used 
flexibly, and when there are no pure profits, then the optimal tax system will 
lead to efficient production. In particular, if  a country is a price taker in the 
world capital market, then efficient production means that investment occurs 
until the marginal rate of return equals that prevailing on the world market. 
Therefore, in such a setting, the optimal source-based capital income tax rate 
should be zero. The intuition underlying this result is very simple: In a small 
open economy, a source-based tax on capital cannot be borne by capital, since 
14.  Competition among such countries would drive any tax down to zero, however. 
15.  See  below,  however, for  a  discussion of  use  of  source-based taxes  to  help enforce 
16.  Tax rates might also depend on the form of the financial claim to the real capital income. 
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capital owners will not invest in the country unless they earn the same return 
as they earn elsewhere. Therefore, the tax ultimately must be paid by  immo- 
bile factors, presumably land and labor. But in that case, a direct tax on these 
factors would dominate, since it would have the same incidence yet not distort 
the international flow of capital. 
What if firms can earn a rate of return above the world rate? Within a closed 
economy,  a tax  on pure  profits,  as occurs under a cash-flow  tax,  does not 
distort allocations,  and  so is attractive on efficiency grounds.”  In an open 
economy, however, pure profits may also be mobile. For example, if the prof- 
its are tied  to  technology  rather than  to location,  then the firm will  locate 
production based on economic conditions in the available countries. An open 
economy would then be able to extract rents from the firm only to the extent 
to which the country provides locational advantages greater than exist else- 
where.  A  small country presumably  provides  at best  small advantages; the 
implication, based on the same reasoning as before, is that the optimal tax on 
these pure profits is close to zero.I8 
The Diamond-Mirrlees  argument also implies, however, that a large open 
economy will wish to equate the domestic marginal product of  capital to the 
marginal cost to the country of extra funds on the world market. As a result, a 
country such as the U.S., which is large relative to the world capital market, 
has the incentive to take advantage of this  market power by restricting  net 
capital flows.  Given that the U.S. has recently  been  a net borrower in the 
world capital market, this would imply taxing investment  in order to reduce 
net borrowing.  Before the  1980s, when the U.S.  was a capital exporter, the 
incentives would instead have been to subsidize investment to restrict capital 
exports. Canada does not plausibly  have market power in the world capital 
markets, so should not attempt to change investment incentives.  I9 
Except  as a means  to take  advantage of  monopoly power,  are there any 
other ways of explaining the continued though relatively minor role of corpo- 
rate taxes in the U.S.  and Canada? One traditional rationalization for the cor- 
porate income tax is that it is necessary to prevent wholesale avoidance of  a 
residence-based tax on equity income, given the favorable treatment of accru- 
ing capital  gains under  existing  tax  systems. This argument is appropriate 
only in a closed economy, however, where domestic shareholders can be taxed 
indirectly on their accruing capital gains through imposing a corporate tax on 
domestic corporations. In a small open economy, the rate of return earned by 
17.  See, for example, Mirrlees (1972). 
18.  If the profits arise from control of a patent, then the patent right itself can be relocated to a 
tax-free country, and the pure profits paid in the form of a tax-deductible license fee to this coun- 
try, with no change in the location of production. 
19.  See Gordon and Varian (1989). however, for an argument that even a small country may 
have market power with respect to equity issued in the country, due to its idiosyncratic risk. See 
also Gordon (1988), who argues that when each country produces a distinct good, each country 
has market power and the optimal use of this market power will lead it to restrict net capital flows. 83  Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
domestic residents on their savings, before personal taxes, is set by the world 
market and so is unchanged by a domestic source-based tax. 
A related argument is that the corporate tax prevents avoidance of the do- 
mestic tax on labor income, at least in closely held corporations. Without the 
corporate tax, shareholder-employees in such firms have the incentive to leave 
their labor earnings in the firm, thereby allowing their shares to increase in 
value. When they need cash, they can simply sell some of their shares in the 
firm, paying tax on the accumulated gains at the more favorable capital gains 
rate. A cash-flow tax on corporate income at the same rate as the labor income 
tax would eliminate this opportunity, though it might discourage firms earning 
pure  profits  from locating  in the  country.  A  better  alternative,  at  least  in 
theory, would be to shift from a labor income tax to a consumption tax. Given 
the appropriate treatment of bequests, both have the same lifetime incidence, 
but the consumption tax is not vulnerable to the above evasion strategy. 
Certainly if a firm imposes costs on the public sector through use of public 
services  and  facilities,  then  user  fees  would  be  appropriate,  even  in  the 
Diamond-Mirrlees  setting.  It  is difficult to justify  a tax  on capital  income 
based on this reasoning, however. 
These arguments  together  suggest  that  at  least  a  small  open economy 
should not make use of source-based capital income taxes. However, source- 
based capital income taxation in one country imposes clear externalities on 
other countries, suggesting that countries may gain by jointly agreeing to use 
source-based taxes.  In particular,  when one country raises its source-based 
capital income tax, capital flows to other countries, raising wage rates in the 
other countries  and raising tax revenues  if  these  countries also use source- 
based capital income taxes. In fact, a uniform capital income tax at source is 
equivalent to a uniform tax based on residence. While a residence-based tax 
is very difficult to enforce, given the government’s lack of independent infor- 
mation about capital income earned abroad by its residents, enforcement of a 
source-based tax in theory should be much easier,  since any activity  within 
the country can be monitored by the tax authorities. Therefore, countries may 
well find it attractive to jointly tax capital  income at source as a means of 
taxing indirectly the capital income earned by their residents.20  The U.S. and 
Canada together, however, are not much larger relative  to the world capital 
market than the U.S. alone, suggesting that the room for Pareto-improving 
gains between these two countries alone may be quite limited. 
Furthermore, source-based taxation,  at least of  multinational firms, has its 
own enforcement  problems.  There are many  ways in which a multinational 
can shift accounting profits toward the country with the lowest statutory tax 
rate, even without changing the location of real activity. The easiest approach 
20.  See Giovannini and Hines (1990)  for a discussion of how transfers might be made between 
governments so that the allocation of revenue among countries would be equivalent to that arising 
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is probably through manipulation of the transfer prices assigned to goods and 
services moving between firms within the multinational.  Similarly, the rnulti- 
national can locate patents for new technology in the country with the lowest 
tax rate.  Yet  another approach is to do the bulk of the debt financing for the 
multinational in the country with the highest tax rate, using perhaps as collat- 
eral the assets located in other countries. Governments have little ability to 
monitor the diverse nature of  transactions  within a firm and can effectively 
challenge only a small fraction of these schemes. 
Given that  multinationals  can quickly and easily shift taxable income to- 
ward  those countries  with the lowest  statutory tax rate, each country  has a 
strong incentive to cut its statutory tax rate in order to benefit from this pro- 
cess. Tax competition then drives statutory tax rates towards zero, even if the 
location of real activity is not very sensitive to relative tax rates. 
The above discussion  of  optimal tax  policy  assumes  that  capital  is fully 
mobile in response to differences in rates of return. Once capital is invested in 
a country, however,  it is difficult to move even in response to high tax rates. 
Therefore, while the amount of  new investment may be very sensitive to tax 
rates, the amount of existing capital may be virtually fixed. As a result, at any 
date a country has an incentive to seize any existing capital but then to prom- 
ise never to do so again, in order not to discourage new investment.*’ Assum- 
ing it could make such a binding  promise, then by the above arguments  it 
would choose never to tax new investment. But governments have no way to 
precommit their future tax policy. If no commitment has been made, then once 
new  investment  occurs and  the capital has become  immobile, the  country 
again has the incentive to seize the capital. This is known as the “time con- 
sistency” problem. Perhaps reputation effects inhibit even the initial seizure of 
capital. Alternatively,  the country  can subsidize  initial investments to com- 
pensate for the taxes that inevitably will be collected from these investments 
at a later date, regardless of what may have been promised. 
2.1.3 
So far, we have ignored the incentives created by existing double-taxation 
conventions. Given these conventions, how does the forecasted behavior of 
each government change? What joint tax  structure would  be forecasted  to 
arise? Comparing this tax structure with that which arises without this conven- 
tion,  can  we  explain why  countries  choose to  adopt  it? Existing  double- 
taxation conventions affect the taxation in the home country of both portfolio 
income earned abroad by domestic investors and corporate income repatriated 
from foreign subsidiaries by a domestically based multinational. In each case, 
Capital Income Taxation under the Current Law 
21.  The same incentives can exist even with taxation based on residence.  For example, if 
foreigners have large holdings of domestically issued bonds, then a government has the incentive 
to inflate the currency unexpectedly, thereby wiping out its debt to foreigners. 85  Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
the home country allows a tax credit for particular taxes paid abroad, whereas 
our previous discussion assumed that foreign tax payments were deductible. 
One further complication ignored in the previous discussion was the use of 
a dividend-credit  scheme in Canada. The incentives created by this scheme 
are complicated enough that they merit a separate discussion. 
Withholding Taxes on Por@olio  Income 
Let us  begin  by  examining  the  equilibrium  use  of  withholding taxes on 
portfolio income earned by foreign investors. Existing double-taxation con- 
ventions allow a tax credit in the home country for withholding taxes paid on 
portfolio income accruing in the host country, with a maximum credit equal 
to the taxes due on the income in the home country. If tax treaties did not also 
specify the rate of withholding tax, how would each country respond? 
Assume first that tax evasion is not a problem,  so that each country can 
effectively tax income  earned  by  domestic residents from foreign portfolio 
holdings. Consider first the incentives faced by a small host country. Since a 
withholding tax does not affect the net-of-tax earnings of foreign investors, as 
long as the withholding tax rate remains below the domestic tax rate faced by 
these foreign investors on their portfolio  income,  the tax produces revenue 
without any loss to domestic residents.  Therefore,  the  host country  should 
choose to raise this tax rate at least up to the foreign tax rate.22  If the tax rate 
is  raised  further,  however,  it  does  discourage  capital  inflows,  and  the 
Diamond-Mirrlees  reasoning still implies that a small open economy would 
not choose to impose such  distortion^.^^ 
How would the home government behave, given this foreign withholding 
tax rate? In Gordon (1992), I find that the home country, taking the foreign 
withholding tax rate as given, would never choose a tax rate on the portfolio 
income of domestic residents equal to this foreign withholding  tax rate; the 
optimal tax rate could in principle be either higher than this rate or zero.24 
When the tax rate is below this point, raising the tax rate affects the net-of-tax 
rate of return  only of domestic investments, and so acts like a source-based 
tax. Within this range, a tax increase is therefore undesirable. When the tax 
rate is above the foreign withholding tax rate, however, a tax increase affects 
foreign and domestic holdings equally, making tax increases just above the 
foreign rate more attractive than tax increases just below the foreign rate. This 
implies that there is no Nash equilibrium set of tax rates.25 
22.  With a diversity of foreign tax rates, the story becomes a bit more complicated, since the 
country is no longer a price-taker in the world capital market. 
23.  As noted before, a large open economy would set its taxes to take advantage of this market 
power. 
24.  Bond and Samuelson (1989) find, under different assumptions that allow each country to 
tax domestic and foreign income at different rates, that the optimal tax rate must be higher. 
25.  Gordon (1992) shows that there will be a Stackelberg equilibrium, however. 86  Roger H.  Gordon 
Without tax evasion as a problem, I argued above that residence-based taxes 
should create few externalities, implying little gain from coordination. There- 
fore, even if  the treaty led to a clear outcome, it would be very unlikely that 
both countries would prefer this outcome to the situation without the treaty. 
What if  investors can evade domestic taxes without any cost or risk by in- 
vesting through foreign financial intermediaries? Then domestic investors can 
always avoid tax by investing abroad, so a withholding tax is simply a source- 
based tax, and by the same arguments used above we conclude that a small 
open economy should not impose a source-based tax. 
If  evasion is costly enough, however, then Gordon (1992) shows that host 
countries will again impose a withholding tax  at a rate equal to the home 
country rate,  rather than act as a tax haven. If  the home country acts as a 
Stackelberg leader, then an equilibrium exists under the double-taxation con- 
vention. From each nation’s perspective, this equilibrium Pareto-dominates 
the equilibrium without the double-taxation convention, in which there are no 
capital income taxes. In principle, further welfare gains should be possible 
through explicit coordination of withholding tax rates; capital income tax rates 
are lower in the above equilibrium than would be jointly optimal. However, 
successful coordination must be done on a worldwide basis; if Canada and the 
U.S.  alone increased their tax rates, then their investors would simply invest 
elsewhere, where tax rates remained low. 
Another possible explanation for why countries impose withholding taxes 
is that each country’s equity is a unique asset, if only because it provides risk 
diversification not available elsewhere. In that case, each country has the in- 
centive to take advantage of its monopoly power by,  for example, imposing a 
withholding tax on payments to foreign equity holders  .26 What if  those paying 
this tax include domestic investors buying through a foreign intermediary to 
evade domestic taxes? Imposing a withholding tax remains attractive as long 
as taxing capital income is part of the desired tax 
If the only motivation toward imposing withholding taxes is to take advan- 
tage of  market power, then there would be a joint efficiency gain from reduc- 
ing these trade distortions by jointly setting a low ceiling for withholding tax 
rates. In theory, Canada should gain more from such an agreement, given the 
much greater market power of the U.S.28  Note that the agreement in this case 
reduces  withholding tax  rates from those chosen in the Nash  equilibrium, 
26.  For further discussion, see Gordon and Varian (1989). 
27.  The withholding tax  also reduces the incentive to use foreign financial  intermediaries, 
leading to potential efficiency gains if domestic intermediaries are more efficient at handling do- 
mestic investments. 
28.  Such an agreement could require coordination of withholding tax  rates with respect to 
third  countries. Otherwise, the  optimal  Canadian withholding tax  rates toward third  countries 
would presumably be low, given the limits on its market power. As a result, third parties could 
then purchase U.S.  equity through Canadian financial intermediaries, paying two rounds of low 
withholding tax rates as the funds traveled from the U.S.  to Canada and then to the thud country, 
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whereas the treaty would jointly raise withholding tax rates when its objective 
is to stem tax evasion. 
Corporate Taxation of Repatriated Earnings 
Previously, I argued that source-based tax rates would be at or near zero in 
a  Nash  equilibrium.  How  do existing double-taxation  conventions  dealing 
with repatriated  corporate earnings change the equilibrium  behavior  of  the 
two governments? Let us ignore initially the effects of taxation at repatriation 
rather than at accrual and assume that all capital flows are direct investments 
by multinational corporations. 
Under the provisions of the tax treaty, a source-based tax assessed just on 
foreign direct investment does not affect investment incentives as long as the 
source-based  tax  rate  is below  the corporate tax  rate  in the multinational’s 
home country.  Therefore, each country has the incentive to set its source- 
based corporate tax rate on foreign direct investment equal to the corporate 
tax rate prevailing in the other country.29 
The incentives faced by the host country do not end here, however. Since a 
multinational  pays the same tax rate regardless of the location of an invest- 
ment, the before-tax rate of return on investments in the two countries would 
be equated. However,  when one country acquires funds from the other coun- 
try, it pays the net-of-tax rate of  return on these funds, as a result of the source- 
based taxes. A small open economy would therefore want to equate the value 
of the marginal product of  capital with this net-of-tax rate of  return paid for 
funds acquired from abroad, or earned on funds invested abroad. In order to 
induce firms to equate the marginal product of capital with the net-of-tax cost 
of funds, the government could provide a suitable direct subsidy to new in- 
vestment.30  This subsidy produces the desired result as long as it is treated as 
extra income, rather than as a reduction in the creditable tax payment under 
the tax treaty.31 
What are the incentives faced by the home country? As before,  given the 
tax rate imposed in the host country, the home country would set its corpo- 
rate tax rate either to zero or to some rate above the host country’s tax rate. 
When its rate is below the host country’s tax rate, the tax is simply a source- 
based tax and so is undesirable. When the rate is higher than the source coun- 
try’s  tax rate, then the tax  at the margin  is a residence-based  tax and so is 
potentially desirable. The fact that the host country receives some of the rev- 
enue makes the tax more attractive at the margin, since less is lost from any 
drop in investment due to a tax increase. 
Given that multinationals are based in both countries, each country is both 
29.  I assume here that if the resulting tax rate on domestic investors is higher than is desired, 
30.  The appropriate subsidy rate would be f/(l -  11, where f is the residence-based tax rate, 
31.  For further discussion, see Findlay (1986). 
then the government can rebate the excess through, for example, a dividend-credit scheme. 
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a home country and a host country for some investment. A Nash equilibrium 
may or may not exist. If not, one country, the U.S. for example, could act as 
a  Stackelberg  leader.  As before, the  resulting  equilibrium  should  provide 
higher  welfare  in  each  country  than  exists  in  the  equilibrium  without  the 
double-taxation convention, in which capital income taxes are not used. Fur- 
ther gains from worldwide coordination exist, but not much can be accom- 
plished on a bilateral basis. 
How do the results change if  we take into account that investments made 
through a foreign subsidiary are taxed only at repatriation rather than at ac- 
crual? As Jun (1987) shows, postponement of realization drives the effective 
tax rate on the initial equity investment down toward (and in the limit equal 
to) the tax rate in the host country, while Hartman (1985) argues that for in- 
vestments financed by retained earnings, the effective tax rate is simply the 
host country tax rate. But if the effective tax rate is the host country tax rate, 
then a small open host country would not choose to impose such a tax. 
What happens if capital flows to foreign firms can take the form of portfolio 
investments, rather than just direct investment by foreign subsidiaries? Funds 
can flow from the home country to the host country either by direct investment 
by a multinational, which itself is owned by home country individuals, or else 
by purchase of equity in host country firms by home country individuals. In 
either case, the same host country corporate taxes are paid, and home country 
individuals owe tax at the same rate on the net income they receive.32  The key 
difference is that with direct investment by  a multinational,  supplementary 
taxes might be owed to the home country. If so, portfolio investment is pre- 
ferred for tax reasons.  If there are no nontax reasons favoring direct invest- 
ment,  then supplementary  taxes  would  never be paid  at repatriation,  and a 
small open host country would therefore not impose a source-based tax. 
Dividend-Credit Schemes 
What incentives are created by the presence of the dividend-credit  scheme 
in Canada? Most of the discussion of the effects of  such a scheme assume a 
closed economy. But as Boadway and Bruce (1989) emphasize, the effects of 
the scheme are very different in an open economy. For simplicity, assume that 
the  scheme provides full. integration of  the corporate and personal  tax sys- 
tems, and assume to begin with that the Canadian corporate tax rate is below 
the U.S. corporate rate. 
When Canadian corporations invest in the U.S., they must pay U.S. cor- 
porate taxes on their foreign earnings. When the earnings are repatriated, no 
corporate surtax is due, but shareholders still receive a dividend credit based 
on the difference between their personal tax rate and the Canadian corporate 
tax rate.  If the corporate tax rate exceeds the personal  tax rate,  then on net 
32.  This ignores the dividend-credit scheme available in Canada for income from domestic 
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Canada provides a subsidy for direct investment by  Canadian multinationals 
in the U.S. and thereby raises the return to savings in Canada above the return 
available in the world market.33  This subsidy is not available when Canadian 
individuals buy shares in U.S. corporations, so this scheme favors direct in- 
vestment over portfolio investment. 
How does its presence affect the equilibrium corporate tax rates? As a home 
country, when Canada raises its corporate tax rate it increases the subsidy it 
gives to investments by Canadian investors in the U.S.,  making it more likely 
that the optimal tax rate is zero rather than above the U.S. rate. As a host 
country, however, Canada would still wish to set its corporate tax rate equal to 
the U.S. rate. Therefore, on net Canada would more likely prefer a tax rate 
below the U.S.  rate. 
The U.S.,  as Stackelberg leader, would now have to take into account that 
Canada would more likely keep its corporate tax rate below that of  the U.S. 
This would certainly affect the optimal tax rate in the U.S. 
2.2  Tax Policy, Given Free 'Ikade 
Based on recent agreements, all tariffs and most nontariff barriers to trade 
between the U.S. and Canada will be eliminated by  1998. What implications 
will this policy change have for the domestic tax structure in each country? 
Assume to begin with that each country is free to use tariffs, but that trade 
is not otherwise restricted.  As noted above, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) 
showed that a small open economy that imposes excise taxes on all goods 
would choose to produce efficiently under an optimal tax system. This implies 
that it would choose not to distort trade patterns. As emphasized in Gordon 
and Levinsohn (1990), however, this does not necessarily imply that a country 
would avoid use of tariffs. In particular, the effects of an excise tax on a partic- 
ular good can be duplicated by a production tax and an import tariff or export 
subsidy on that good. It may be that it is easier to administer a combination of 
a tariff and a production tax, at equal rates, on some goods than to administer 
an excise tax on these goods. Both have the same economic effects, and nei- 
ther distorts trade  To the degree that tax or other policies distort 
relative output prices, then optimal policy would involve undoing these dis- 
tortions at the border through suitable export taxes and subsidies. 
Of course, if a country does have market power in a particular good, then it 
33. Specifically, under the dividend-credit scheme, shareholders receiving a dollar of dividends 
are credited with earning  1/(1 -  T,) in pre-corporate-tax  profits, where Tc is the corporate tax 
rate. On this income, they owe personal taxes at rate fc,  but receive a credit for corporate taxes 
already paid, implying a net tax liability of (t, -  TJ(1  -  TJ.  By assumption, r,  <  Tc.  If income 
Y is repatriated from foreign earnings and generates no corporate surtax at repatriation, then net 
tax payments in Canada on these earnings are (tc - TJ(1  - T,)Y < 0, implying a subsidy to 
foreign investment. 
34.  Trade distortions are present in this argument when the tax law favors purchases of goods 
produced in a particular location. 90  Roger H. Gordon 
will  want to take advantage of  this market power, as shown in  the optimal 
tariff  literature. However, doing so does not require use of  explicit tariffs, 
since again the combination of a production tax and a consumption subsidy 
has the same effects. 
One of the main source-based taxes in the U.S. and Canada is the corporate 
income tax. This tax raises the prices of  corporate relative to noncorporate 
goods, and alters relative corporate prices due to differences in capital-output 
ratios and due to idiosyncracies in depreciation and other detailed provisions 
in the tax law. Under optimal tariff policy in a small country, these distortions 
would be offset at the border. 
Domestic regulations may also distort relative prices, creating the incentive 
to use tariffs to offset these distortions. For example, agricultural price sup- 
ports lead food prices to be above marginal costs, justifying export subsidies 
on these products.  Similarly, the U.S.  lumber industry may  face a below- 
market price for use of the National Forests, leading lumber prices to be below 
marginal costs and thereby justifying export taxes. 
The Canadian sales tax  also creates nontrivial distortions to the relative 
prices of  imported and domestically produced goods, as reported in  Dodge 
and Sargent (1987). Since the tax is imposed at the wholesale rather than the 
retail level, the amount of tax collected on a finished product depends on the 
number of  transactions that occur between firms at the wholesale stage. To 
some degree,  industries can change how they organize their production in 
order to minimize the total sales tax payments that are incurred, but doing so 
has its own costs. 
What will be the implications for source-based taxes, and for regulatory 
distortions, of  the free-trade agreement between the U.S.  and Canada? This 
agreement will have no economic effect if each country can costlessly offset 
the change through a suitable modification to its domestic tax structure as it 
applies specifically to income flows between the two countries. To  compen- 
sate for the drop in tariff or nontariff barriers for a particular good, each coun- 
try could compensate by  cutting the domestic tax (increasing the subsidy) on 
production of  that good and increasing the sales tax rate on consumption of 
that good. To avoid any economic changes, tariffs between the U.S. or Canada 
and third countries would need to be suitably readjusted. 
These compensating adjustments in the domestic tax system, to neutralize 
the effects of the free-trade agreement between the U.S. and Canada, are sub- 
stantial and  awkward. If  they cannot be  made, then source-based taxes on 
production will become more costly from each country’s perspective, since 
the resulting distortions to the trade pattern between the U.S.  and Canada 
could no longer be neutralized by  suitable border distortions. Given the large 
volume of  trade between the two countries, these distortions will be impor- 
tant, creating significant pressure to cut distortions to the relative prices of 
different goods to maintain an efficient composition of trade. Similarly, regu- 
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Various responses to these pressures are possible. For one, policy distor- 
tions to the relative prices of domestic output can be reduced by “leveling the 
playing field” by eliminating differences in the effective tax rates on different 
industries. If  the tax  system raises the prices of  all domestically produced 
goods by the same percentage, then the exchange rate between the Canadian 
and the U.S. dollars would simply readjust, leaving trading incentives un- 
changed. Such a shift in the tax system in each country has been occurring 
recently in any case, whether or not connected to the U.S.-Canada free-trade 
agreement. To the extent that regulations create price distortions (e.g., various 
agricultural programs designed to raise crop prices artificially), then each 
country  would  face competitive pressure to  redesign these regulations to 
“level the playing field” between affected sectors and other domestic indus- 
tries. 
From the perspective of the two countries together, however, as long as any 
particular industry is equally favored or disfavored by  the tax and regulatory 
system in both countries, no policy distortion to trade patterns is created. In 
some cases, harmonizing the relative tax rates on different industries in the 
two countries may be easier or more desirable than allowing competitive pres- 
sures to undermine rate  differences across industries, which  each country 
might in principle have desired. Tariffs between the U.S. or Canada and third 
countries can then be used to neutralize these distortions. 
Coordination between the two countries can also affect the size of  tariff 
barriers with respect to the rest of the world. Together the two countries have 
more market power than either country has in isolation, particularly in goods 
such as lumber or wheat. Coordination would therefore lead to increased re- 
strictions on their combined trade with the rest of the world. 
Coordination of  policies between the two countries, whether concerning 
policies with respect to each other or with respect to the rest of  the world, 
does not require a written treaty. A country that deviates from an  implicit 
agreement could incur “punishment” from the other country in some form. As 
long as the threat of “punishment” is a sufficient deterrent, the implicit agree- 
ment will be sustainable.35  This use of threats to enforce an implicit agreement 
is commonly seen with regard to tariff policy, and may well occur with regard 
to tax policy as well.36 
2.3  Tax Policy, Given Mobility of Individuals 
So far, the discussion has ignored tax and expenditure pressures created by 
the movement of individuals across borders. Yet  travel between the two coun- 
tries is extensive, taking the form of  tourism and business trips as well as 
35. There is a large literature in cooperative game theory on the sustainability of  such a coop- 
36.  Since tariffs can be  duplicated through use of  a suitable set of domestic taxes, the two 
erative outcome. 
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changes  in  the  location  of  employment or even  of  citizenship.  The U.S.- 
Canada free-trade  agreement reduces some restrictions on the movement  of 
individuals across the border. What pressures are created by such movement 
of individuals? 
This is in many ways the key question examined in the local public finance 
literature. As argued by Buchanan and Goetz (1972) and many others, mobil- 
ity of individuals imposes externalities on jurisdictions,  which depend on the 
degree to which an individual pays an amount in taxes that differs from the 
costs the individual imposes on the jurisdiction,  whether in the form of  in- 
creased costs of  public services or increased congestion. This applies in both 
the sending and the receiving jurisdiction.  When a community gains on net 
from the presence of an individual, because tax payments exceed the costs the 
individual imposes on the community, the community has an incentive to en- 
courage  immigration;  the  converse  is  also true.  This  competitive pressure 
pushes the tax system toward a benefit-tax structure in which the net gain to 
the jurisdiction from acquiring or losing an extra individual is competed down 
to zero. At that point, individuals simply pay for the costs they impose on the 
community. 
What implications does this story have for tax policy at the national level? 
Consider first the pressures created by temporary migration, such as tourism. 
Through  such migration,  countries  trade  in  services as well  as in 
Therefore, tax and regulatory policies potentially can distort the relative trade 
in services versus goods, as well as distort the composition of trade in goods 
that physically cross the border. Countries would face competitive pressure to 
reduce or eliminate policy distortions to the composition of trade, which now 
includes services as well as “tradables.” 
When individuals cross the border,  however, they also normally  increase 
the costs of public services, since they make use of roads, police protection, 
and other services.  A country would want to encourage immigration if tax 
payments exceed the net costs imposed by immigration,  as well as the con- 
verse.  By  the  Diamond-Mirrlees  reasoning,  a  small open  economy  would 
simply charge for the services obtained, whether directly or indirectly, and so 
would design tax policy to increase the cost of goods used by migrants above 
the cost of goods that are physically exported. The playing field would  be 
intentionally “tilted” to compensate for the costs imposed on the public sector 
when certain goods are purchased. Countries with relative market power in, 
for example, tourist-related services,  would attempt to charge even more to 
take advantage of this market power. 
Individuals who change their country of employment create more extensive 
changes in the tax revenue and public service costs in each country. Presum- 
ably, the relocation  of  higher-paid  individuals creates larger relative  gains, 
since their tax payments are relatively large compared to the cost of the public 
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services they require. Similarly, each country has an incentive to discourage 
the immigration of  those who impose net fiscal costs, be they the poor, the 
sick, or the elderly. 
Competition for individuals who provide a net fiscal gain to the jurisdiction 
therefore reduces the degree to which the fiscal system redistributes from rich 
to poor and again pushes toward a benefit-tax system. But the resulting tax 
structure cannot simply equate benefits and tax payments in present value over 
the lifetime, since individuals can remain in the country during those periods 
when they gain on net, and leave when they lose on net. Therefore, even the 
timing of taxes would be pushed to coincide with the timing of benefits. As a 
result, national debt would be discouraged, since it creates the incentive to 
emigrate during those periods when the debt is repaid. Similarly, redistribu- 
tive policies such as social security would come under pressure, since those 
who work for a short period under existing law gain substantially from the 
system. Since nonworkers do not pay labor income taxes but do make use of 
public services, and often more extensively than workers do, even labor in- 
come taxes may not easily be sustainable. A country that relies heavily on a 
labor income tax would become a haven for nonworkers, such as students or 
the retired. Public services such as subsidized college education or free medi- 
cal care would attract residents of the other country who hope to take advan- 
tage of  these s~bsidies.~~  All of  these are examples of  pressures towards a 
benefit-tax structure. Which tax system most resembles a benefit-tax structure 
depends on the composition of public expenditures. If  consumption of public 
services roughly corresponds with consumption of private goods, then a con- 
sumption tax or a VAT may most closely approximate a benefit tax. User fees 
certainly approximate a benefit tax.39 
This evolution towards a benefit-tax structure would occur even if  both 
countries desired a redistributive fiscal policy. Based on this reasoning, the 
conventional wisdom  in public finance has always been  that redistribution 
should be done at the national rather than at the local level. Retranslated to 
this context, the analysis suggests that policies regarding redistribution should 
be coordinated between the two countries. Of course, coordination must cover 
both tax and expenditure policies, otherwise each country can make use of its 
remaining flexibility to attract those who pay more than they receive. 
The Tiebout literature argues, however, that expenditures financed by ben- 
efit  taxes  should  not  need  coordination; competition among jurisdictions 
pushes them to offer an efficient composition and level of public services.4o 
38.  Of course, countries may impose residency requirements for these benefits, to some de- 
gree lessening the pressures. 
39.  The recent shift from a property tax to  a head tax in financing public services in the United 
Kingdom could be interpreted as a response to this type of pressure. 
40.  Given that a VAT should roughly correspond to a benefit tax, at least relative to other taxes 
used at  the national level, it is ironic that the EC has focused its tax coordination efforts on this 
particular tax. For discussion of various limitations of the Tiebout argument, see, for  example, 
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How can jurisdictions choose the composition and level of  services financed 
by  benefit taxes without coordination, however, and yet agree to restrictions 
on  their expenditure policies to  prevent  undermining of  interjurisdictional 
agreements on redistribution? In  a federal system, these contradictory pres- 
sures are avoided by having redistribution done at the national level. Compe- 
tition among communities then leads to a local benefit-tax structure. In this 
case there is no fiscal gain to a community from attracting those who pay 
relatively more to the national government. Without a federal structure, how- 
ever, coordination of at least some expenditure policies may be necessary to 
preserve redistributive policies, even though this coordination undermines the 
ability of each government to provide the composition or level of public ex- 
penditures desired by its citizenry. 
At this point, these various pressures will be much more important within 
the EC, where all restrictions to migration are being eliminated, than in  the 
U.S.-Canadian context. The pressures are still there, however, and will surely 
increase over time. 
2.4  Conclusions 
When analyzing the fiscal implications of unrestricted mobility among ju- 
risdictions, the local public finance literature concludes that the fiscal system 
will be driven toward a benefit-tax structure, in which people pay in taxes an 
amount appropriate to cover the costs they impose on the public sector. Yet 
existing national tax systems in the U.S. and Canada differ substantially from 
benefit-tax structures. As a result, the increasing mobility of  output, capital, 
and even labor, between the two economies will create a variety of pressures 
pushing the tax system towards a benefit-tax structure. 
Where this pressure will be strongest depends on the degree of mobility of 
particular types of goods, services, and people across the border. This paper 
explored in turn the types of  pressures created by  mobility of  capital, unre- 
stricted trade in all outputs, and mobility of people. 
Even though tax competition will push each country’s fiscal structure to- 
ward  that of  a benefit tax, such a tax system may  not be mutually advanta- 
geous; in fact, both countries may well gain through explicit or implicit coor- 
dination of fiscal policies. In many cases the appropriate form of coordination 
involves equalization of  tax rates. Where, for example, the local public  fi- 
nance literature calls for the national government to handle redistribution, 
given the degree to which individual mobility undermines any one commu- 
nity’s efforts at redistribution, the same logic calls here for coordinating redis- 
tributive policies between the two countries. A number of  other examples of 
fruitful areas for policy coordination are discussed. 
Ultimately, the implications of the increasing interdependence of the two 
economies for their national fiscal structures should be  substantial. Fortu- 95  Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
nately, the two countries can watch the European experience after 1992 to 
learn better how to redesign the existing fiscal systems in the two countries. 
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